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A. INTRODUCTION 
Earnscliffe Research and Communications is pleased to present this report to the 
Independence Standards Board (ISB).  It is based on a second phase of research 
conducted for the Board and focuses upon key questions that remained to be 
answered after our initial work, reported on last year.  There were a few specific 
hypotheses to be tested: 
 Many of those interviewed in the first phase of research felt that the pressures to 
adopt aggressive earnings management techniques may vary depending on the 
size of the company, and on the sector in which its business was focussed.  The 
hypothesis was that pressures from volatile markets and impatient investors 
might be more acutely felt in regard to mid or smaller cap companies, or 
technology sector companies. 
Accordingly, this second phase of inquiry focussed on SEC registrants with 
market capitalization of greater than $250 million, but below the Fortune 500 
threshold.  The sample tilted towards companies in new sectors of the economy, 
including technology, telecommunications, the Internet, and entertainment, and 
some publicly traded companies which have little or no track record of 
profitability, but for who market capitalization has been substantial to date. 
 In the first phase of the research, a number of participants suggested that 
auditing firms other than the very largest might be exposed to greater pressures 
in respect of their independence.  Accordingly, engagement partners selected 
included roughly half from big 5 and half from non big 5 audit firms, all working 
on audits of small to mid cap and technology-oriented companies.   
 In our first phase of research, some audiences expressed a desire to better 
understand what a “responsible individual investor” might feel about the issues 
at stake.  Consequently, we conducted focus groups among people who might be 
considered “responsible investors”: those who personally were significantly 
involved in managing their own portfolios, whose trading habits reveal a longer 
term orientation, and who try to consume as much information as possible about 
the companies they choose to own.  Eight focus groups were conducted in Austin, 
Boston, San Francisco and Chicago with such investors. 
As with the first phase of research the primary objective was to assess the 
perceptions of different audiences around the concept of auditor independence and 
objectivity.  As part of the enquiry, interviewees were asked to consider whether they 
thought a problem currently did exist, what the ideal mix of safeguards would be, and 
which priorities they would set for the future in this area.   
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Both the interviews and focus groups followed a semi-structured agenda, ensuring 
that each interview or group captured a certain amount of essential information, but 
also allowing the interviewees latitude to take the interview in a direction that 
reflected their personal experiences and perspectives.  The interview guide and focus 
group moderator’s guides used are attached to this report as Appendix B and C. 
A total of 51 one on one interviews were conducted, in roughly equal measure from 
the following segments: 
CEO’s of SEC registrant companies 9 
CFO’s of SEC registrants 11 
Chairs of audit committees of such companies 10 
Buy side investment analysts 10 
Audit partners 11 
 
Interviews drawn from the five groups were done in person or on the phone, based 
on the preference of the interviewee.   
Bruce Anderson, Principal and a founding partner of the Earnscliffe Strategy Group, 
Canada’s best-respected public affairs firm, designed and led the research program.  
Questions and comments are welcomed and may be addressed to him directly, at 
613-233-8080, or by email at anderson@earnscliffe.ca 
We would like to acknowledge the helpful guidance of the ISB Board, and the 
considerable assistance of the ISB staff, led by Art Siegel, in the development and 
execution of this project. 
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B. ONE ON ONE INTERVIEWS 
THE STATE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
As with the first phase of research, each interview began with a discussion of the 
participant’s view of the quality and reliability of the financial reporting system in the 
US.  Despite both the sectoral and size differences in the companies from which the 
sample was drawn, the results were remarkably similar to the first group of 
interviewees.  
 Interviewees felt very confident and satisfied with the general standard of 
financial reporting in the US.   
 Most believed that publicity about cases of financial misrepresentation was 
increasing, but that the actual incidence of such behavior was not necessarily on 
the rise. 
 Most felt that the level of integrity of those involved in financial reporting was 
adequate.  Occasional misdeeds were not seen as part of a broader 
phenomenon of declining morality.  Equally, it should be noted, there was no buy-
in to the notion that auditors were more moral than other actors. 
 Roughly half felt that financial reporting requirements were becoming more 
complex, bordering on unreasonably complex.  Most felt that the changes 
required in financial reporting made the output less suited to the needs of retail 
investors, and of mixed value to institutional investors. 
KEY FINDING 
FINANCIAL REPORTING IS GENERALLY WELL REGARDED 
Reasons: 
 Basic human nature, honesty, integrity 
 Fear of civil and criminal penalties 
 Rules, regulations, standards, oversight, sanctions 
 Desire for ongoing access to capital 
 Audited financials, while an important foundation for analyzing a company’s 
prospects are less central to investment decisions than they were in the past. 
In summary, most of those interviewed in this second phase of research offered 
similar views to those found in the initial research work.  There was a generally high 
 Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board  July 2000 
- 5 - 
   EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH  
& COMMUNI CATI ONS 
level of confidence in financial reporting, and a sense that the system of safeguards 
was functioning reasonably well, despite the high profile of some misdeeds.  One 
important exception to this general consensus was among analysts, auditors and 
some management interviewees who displayed more unease about the pressures 
affecting the technology sector.  This exception will be dealt with later in this report. 
THE BROAD VIEW OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Perceptions of the role and performance of auditors were also highly similar to those 
gathered initially. To summarize:    
 Most had a positive view of auditors and the way in which they performed their 
jobs.  They were seen as competent and professional, and conducted audits with 
a high standard of objectivity and independence.   
KEY FINDING 
AUDITORS ARE SEEN TO BE MEETING A HIGH STANDARD OF INDEPENDENCE 
Reasons: 
 Personal attributes including training, integrity  
 Instinct to protect reputation, avoid penalties 
 Appropriate behavior by most clients 
 
 Most felt that the risks of unfavorable perceptions of auditor independence are 
growing, due largely to the provision of non-audit services to auditees. While 
auditors remain mostly of the view that current safeguards will be adequate, 
others are of a different view, and believe additional safeguards are probably 
needed. 
KEY FINDING 
PRESSURES ON THE PERCEPTION OF INDEPENDENCE ARE GROWING 
Reasons: 
 Competition for capital in volatile, momentum oriented markets 
 Auditors selling consulting services to auditees 
 More intense scrutiny by media, regulators 
 
In a nutshell, most feel that audits are not compromised today, but that more may 
need to be done to avoid a deterioration in the perception of auditor independence in 
the future, especially where auditors provide non audit services to auditees.   
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NON AUDIT SERVICES 
As in the first round of research, detailed probing was conducted into the perceived 
pressures on auditor independence. The main findings: 
 When accounting firms only did audit work, the risk of impairment was judged 
acceptable, because the audit firm was presumed to care more deeply about its 
reputation for quality audit work.   
 Most believe that accounting firms today are not indifferent about their 
reputation for quality audits, but are more focused on raising the profile, 
reputation, and profitability of non-audit services.  
 Many took the position that these pressures were not simply a function of audit 
firms drive for growth, but that auditees were responsible as well.  They noted two 
factors: The drive to limit fees for audits; and the fact that many auditees 
specifically ask their audit firms to accept consulting assignments.   
KEY FINDING 
NON AUDIT SERVICES SOLD TO AUDITEES POSE PERCEPTION CHALLENGES 
 Audit firms seem more preoccupied with consulting reputation, revenues 
 Some clients demand consulting services, audit fee cutbacks  
 How would angry shareholders perceive this, after a setback. 
 
 The situations where consulting assignments were more likely to raise concerns 
about independence are illustrated below: 
KEY FINDING 
SOME CONSULTING SITUATIONS TRIGGER GREATER CONCERNS 
 Where fees greatly or routinely exceed audit fees 
 Where contracts are assigned rather than bid competitively 
 Where assignment is of a nature to become potential audit subject 
 Where assignment is key to a firm, partner or office’s future strategy 
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EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Findings on the question of earnings management were similar to the first round of 
research, with some specific exceptions (buy side analysts and tech sector related) 
noted later. The general view can be summarized as follows: 
1. Earnings management is not a new phenomenon, but has more profile and 
sensitivity given the long running bull market. 
2. Half feel that earnings management efforts are more aggressive today, while the 
other half dispute that assertion.    
3. Many say that earnings management efforts are assumed and taken into 
account by the market, and do not therefore distort the price of the equities 
involved.    
4. Many made the point that the real effort is to massage expectations, rather than 
earnings.  While they said that this was inappropriate, they also said that the 
actual figures being reported were painting an accurate picture of the financial 
health of the company involved. 
5. Very few believe that auditors have much to do with aggressive earnings 
management efforts, because they are not heavily involved in quarterly reporting, 
and would not go along with aggressive practices even if they were.   
KEY FINDING 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MORE SENSITIVE, BUT NOTHING NEW 
 Often factored in by market watchers, analysts 
 Doesn’t usually involve auditors, or reflect on their image 
 More worrisome where auditor-auditee are size mismatched 
 More feeling of concern vis a vis the technology sector 
 
6. There was a general consensus that earnings management issues were more 
legitimate where auditors are smaller and clients are larger (seen as rare and 
therefore more of a theoretical issue), and in relation to new sectors of the 
economy, and in particular, new participants in those sectors.  Mostly, this latter 
point was based on a view that there was more room for interpretation of 
accounting rules and standards, and that the market rewards and penalties for 
tech stocks put more pressure on integrity.  But a number of participants said 
that auditors couldn’t help but be aware of the fact that missing targets carried a 
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huge penalty and exceeding targets carried a huge upside for their clients, 
something that was unusual to this sector, and a cause for concern. 
In summary, earnings management is seen as inappropriate, but not new, not 
unmanageable, and mostly not related to the work of auditors.  Concerns are more 
notable with respect to new players in new sectors of the economy, and more 
findings in this area will be discussed later in this report. 
CURRENT INDEPENDENCE SAFEGUARDS  
Other than those with auditing experience, few had any detailed knowledge about the 
safeguards that exist today.  However, many sensed that current safeguards might 
be insufficient to sustain the perception of the independence of auditors.  There 
were, as in the initial phase of probing, important differences by segment: 
 Auditors generally felt that current safeguards were adequate or needed only 
slight fine-tuning.   
 Audit committee chairs tended to see safeguards as work in progress, requiring 
constant attention, and continuous improvement. 
 Auditees assumed that current safeguards were probably appropriate, but were 
concerned about protecting their reputation, and inclined to the idea that more 
guidance might be useful. 
 Analysts felt that the current safeguards were all necessary and functioning 
reasonably well, but they also believed that the non-audit services question might 
require further safeguards, and that the traditional accounting rules applied to 
technology companies represent a particular challenge. This point was not so 
much about the independence of auditors, but rather the huge stakes and lack of 
history in evaluating the technology sector. 
KEY FINDING 
LOW AWARENESS, LITTLE CRITICISM OF CURRENT SAFEGUARDS 
 Apart from auditors, few know much about in-firm safeguards 
 More awareness would help reduce apprehensions 
 Rising scrutiny, non-audit services may signal need for more guidance 
 
In summary, most respondents generally held that a combination of prevention and 
re-mediation safeguards that were in place were performing a useful role, even if 
they were unfamiliar with the details of all of them (Auditors clearly were familiar with 
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the safeguards and had even greater confidence in them).  The entry of audit firms 
into consulting was seen as logical and unlikely to create a real problem of audit 
independence, but the potential for appearance problems was seen as significant.  
As a result, many assumed that safeguards may need to be updated in this area. 
Separately, many sensed that the technology sector represents a particular 
challenge, not because of lax ethics, or independence safeguards, but as a 
consequence of the tremendous stakes, the lack of historical guidance about this 
part of the economy, and the question of whether accounting rules fit this sector as 
well as they fit others. 
POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 
A fair bit of probing was done to determine what interviewees felt should be priorities 
for change in the area of independence safeguards.  Accepting as a starting point 
that not all audiences were equally convinced that change, or much change was 
needed, the main findings were again quite similar with those unearthed in the first 
phase of our work.  They can be summarized as follows: 
 The broad majority felt that there are too many “gray” areas where the role of 
auditor as consultant to their audit clients is concerned. 
 There was a feeling that a combination of measures aimed at avoidance of 
objectivity issues as well as measures aimed at remedying situations once they 
arose was the best approach.  As people voiced this opinion, it was clear that 
they felt that the burden of trying to anticipate and avoid every potential problem 
would be too severe or costly.  Therefore, people tended to the view that if new 
measures were needed, it might be more appropriate to focus on: 
i. Guidance on how to manage (traditional and new) situations that develop so 
that independence is not lost or would not be seen to be lost 
ii. Tougher sanctions for inappropriate behavior to act as a deterrent and to 
reassure the investor community that the issue will be taken seriously by all 
stakeholders in the future. 
 Many advocated a requirement of full disclosure as a way to both deter an 
unhealthy relationship between auditor and client, and to inform investors of any 
risks related thereto. Some were more enthusiastic about this than others, but 
almost everyone favored disclosure over prohibition type approaches. 
 Most preferred the idea of setting forth broad principles, which should underpin 
the relationship between auditor and client.  Alongside these broad principles, 
many endorsed the idea of developing a series of “best practices” advisories.  
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KEY FINDING 
A VARIETY OF SAFEGUARD ENHANCEMENTS DEEMED WORTHWHILE 
 Fewer gray areas, more clarification, better communication 
 Broad principles and best practices, not bright lines 
 Greater disclosure, stronger audit committees 
 Review existing rules, add and subtract as necessary 
 Review audit firm internal practices 
 
 While a significant minority of interviewees felt that the best ultimate solution to 
the independence question would be for consulting and audit practices to 
separate, few anticipated that this would happen in the short term, if at all.  
Therefore, they focussed on where additional clarifications or safeguards might 
help, such as: 
i. Guidance on the nature and size of consulting assignments that pose greater 
or lesser risk. 
ii. Guidance on the best practices for relationship management, marketing of 
consulting services, and partner compensation related thereto. 
 
KEY FINDING 
GREATER PRECISION SOUGHT AROUND NON-AUDIT WORK 
 Nature of marketing and selling activities 
 Nature of services which should not be offered to audit clients 
 Size or thresholds for audit vs. non-audit fees 
 Appropriate role of audit partners 
 Compensation for audit partners 
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ESTABLISHING A “PERCEPTION” TEST 
Perhaps the most overwhelming consensus was the belief that the perception of 
auditor independence is as critical to the integrity of the financial system, as is the 
reality.  At the same time, few could imagine a reasonable way to establish 
safeguards around the idea of perceptions.  
 Virtually all interviewees felt that poor perceptions of the reliability or credibility of 
audited financial statements could be damaging to the efficiency of capital 
markets, regardless of whether there was actual auditor impairment or not.  Most 
felt that, rightly or wrongly, perceptions affected behavior in the marketplace and 
therefore could not be ignored.  
 Many worried about what they viewed as “nonsense” litigation and unhealthy 
skepticism about the state of financial reporting, which they thought could arise 
from such misperceptions. 
 A number of people suggested that growing concerns about perception were 
largely a function of the proliferation of media coverage of financial affairs, which 
one auditor termed “a sit-com of financial reporting”.  Others pointed to the 
concomitant increase in investor interest and participation in the markets. 
 
KEY FINDING 
PERCEPTION CRITICAL, BUT DIFFICULT TO ADDRESS   
 Broader market participation, evolution of economy raises risks 
 Desire to take reasonable precautions, but to avoid overreaction 
 Perception safeguards can only partly work, often have downsides 
 Desire is to define a reasonable perception standard 
 
 While most sensed a growing debate about perception, many worried that it was 
impossible to fully meet a perception standard, since it was “very tough to 
measure when you had crossed the perception line”.  While many were inclined 
to agree with one CFO, who concluded “if the you deal with the actual, then the 
perception will follow”, others felt that this approach would be insufficient, given 
the level of media coverage of problems, and the skepticism which it creates.  
 Almost half of the sample offered the view that trying to meet a perception test 
could be limiting, burdensome and would impose unreasonable costs on 
accounting firms.  Still others were concerned that the instinct to address 
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perception issues might result in either excessive or ambiguous regulation of the 
profession.  This was seen as yet another disincentive to attract, retain and 
nurture talented people within the profession.  One analyst argued that “such a 
drive towards purity will impair the process”. 
 While perception was seen as critical to virtually everyone interviewed, most 
interviewees thought that some attention had to be paid to which particular 
audience’s perceptions needed addressing. Many pointed to the increasing 
numbers of unsophisticated, individual investors.  They worried about the ability 
of many of these investors to make reasonable judgements about the reliability 
and content financial statements, let alone the independence of auditors.  As one 
audit chair noted, there is “such a different set of “they” holding these 
perceptions now”, with varying degrees of economic literacy and financial 
sophistication. 
In short, most felt that while perception was becoming a more important variable in 
auditor independence, there were risks in both ignoring the issue, or in trying to set 
standards that focused too heavily on meeting a perception test.  On balance, most 
felt that it would be useful to try and establish some objective standard of acceptable 
perception, assuming a certain amount of responsibility lay with the investor to be 
reasonably informed, and taking into account the idea that reality is the most 
fundamental test of all. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECTOR TO AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
A large number of interviewees felt that emerging sectors of “the new economy”, 
(especially those in the technology field) where the application of longstanding 
accounting standards may permit or require more “judgement calls” could pose 
unique risks to the perception and perhaps to the reality of the role of the auditor.   
The key findings in this area are as follows: 
 Most did not believe that there was any greater tendency on the part of people in 
the technology sector to act inappropriately.   
 While people in the technology sector were seen as having no lesser ethical 
standards than others, there were real concerns about financial reporting in this 
sector.  These seemed to be mostly tied to two factors: 
i. The unusually high rewards and penalties applied to the financial reporting in 
this sector meant that the individuals were placed under unusually great 
pressures. 
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ii. The application of traditional accounting rules to these new sectors was seen 
to allow more latitude and demand more interpretation than in other sectors. 
 Internet start-ups were seen as especially vulnerable to potential problems.  
In large measure, this was viewed as a function of the relative newness of 
both the lines of business and the accounting rules which governed their 
operation.  As one CEO put it, “the Internet has no history, so you can’t create 
rules”.  The rapidly shifting technology landscape creates its own complexity 
that is seen by many as “leaving more room for inappropriate behavior”. 
 
KEY FINDING 
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR A CAUSE FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CONCERN 
 Not because of a perception of ethical weakness 
 But due to uncertainties about the business model, flexibility in accounting  
 Concern heightened by huge market swings, valuations 
 Many new companies lack infrastructure, talent, want to rely on audit firm 
 
 
 Many interviewees questioned how there could be effective financial reporting 
when there are no revenues to report, while others countered that this was 
simply a new economic reality, and failures were more due to anachronistic 
accounting rules than illegitimate behavior.  Many added that tech companies 
were often far more conservative than they needed to be in their financial 
reporting, because they were so keenly aware of regulatory scrutiny and investor 
skepticism.  
 The key issue for those on both sides of the argument was the ability of the audit 
profession to contribute to accurate valuations of these sorts of companies.  As 
one audit chair put it, “these companies are simply running at a speed that the 
auditors don’t understand”.  For him, like many others, the real challenge was 
establishing “value in kind” by accurately addressing what items were recognized 
and what were expensed.  
 Another audit chair of a “dot.com” was at pains to express how ill equipped the 
accounting rules were to deal with issues such as “goodwill” within technology 
companies.  He cited Microsoft as a classic example of a company with few 
physical assets but enormous intellectual property, and therefore significant and 
fundamental value.  
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 Most agreed that the transition from unprofitable to profitable can be a very 
painful one for these companies, but that once profitable the more traditional 
rules of valuation and accounting could apply.  
 Revenue recognition, especially in software companies, was seen as a very 
ambiguous area.  Some noted the fact that many tech companies book 75% of 
their business in the third month of each quarter, suggesting significant pressure 
to book sales to meet quotas late in the quarter, regardless of when they take 
place.  
 R&D cost allocation within tech companies was seen as another “gray” area, 
where auditors could exercise far too much discretion in the minds of a 
considerable number of people interviewed.  This was cited as especially true for 
the capitalization of “in-process” R&D costs during merger and acquisition 
activity.  Still others suggested that the newness of tech companies had lead to a 
great deal of inconsistency in the application of accounting rules, especially in the 
ways to define the “costs of goods sold”. 
 One very specific challenge to auditor independence within the technology 
sector was regarding systems integration firms, which help companies build 
content delivery architecture.  These companies are faced with the unique 
dilemma of having to partner on accounts with accounting firms frequently.  
Audit firms are clearly critical to the selection of software processes for many 
clients.  As such, these companies felt they needed a formal letter of 
independence from their auditors ensuring that their consulting and audit 
arms are totally separate.  
 
 Still others pointed to both a lack of human resources and expertise in many 
technology companies where the management were highly intelligent, frequently 
young and often with little or no background in financial matters.  One auditor 
noted that the audit firm was reduced to doing routine bookkeeping for a dot.com 
start-up because management lacked even basic accounting skills.  
 Biotechnology companies were viewed as relatively easy to audit by some, but 
others noted that the disclosure and description of what stage products are at 
could be technically complex to understand and therefore potentially 
problematic. 
 Finally, a number of interviewees across various segments suggested 
accounting was more complex and therefore potentially more problematic in 
industries like aerospace, where longer-term procurement contracts made 
significant estimations of profitability necessary.  
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In summary, it was clear that many respondents feel that there are more risks of 
audit problems in the technology sector than in more traditional sectors of the 
economy.  At the same time, these risks are not linked to a perception that 
ethical standards might be more lax, but rather that some of the traditional 
safeguards, such as accounting rules and standards, may apply too loosely or 
allow too much room for discretion, putting investors at greater risk than they 
may assume. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMPANY SIZE TO INDEPENDENCE  
One of the hypotheses to be tested in this phase of the research was whether 
the largest cap companies were more likely to take a more conservative 
approach, and smaller cap companies were more likely to favor aggressive 
accounting, and whether this had any impact on auditors.  The key findings 
around this hypothesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
 For most interviewees size was a double-edged sword. They were equally able 
to imagine the potential for abuses in either scenario.  The consensus 
seemed to be that the corporate culture was the most important determinant 
of ethical behavior on the part of management and outside auditors. 
 
 Larger cap companies were viewed as having more significant internal 
control mechanisms and more sophisticated information systems, which 
allowed for better financial reporting.  On the other hand, they were seen as 
more complex entities to audit and more important to the audit firm in terms 
of fees and reputation.  Accordingly, pressures to retain such clients at any 
cost might be greater.  
 
 Smaller cap companies were seen as often easier to audit, but also less 
stable in terms of their financial performance.  Auditors observed that they 
tended to be much closer to their clients in smaller companies, which relied 
on them for a range of strategic and accounting advice.  This could prove to 
be beneficial, by increasing their knowledge of the company’s operations; but 
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KEY FINDING 
SIZE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT INDEPENDENCE ISSUES 
 Larger companies have more control systems, but are more complex to audit and 
are more important to firms. 
 Smaller companies easier to audit, but more prone to swings  
 Start-ups, smaller caps probably the area of most evident concern, especially if 
expectations around growth rates are high 
 
 The often urgent need for capital in start-ups and smaller companies led 
interviewees to assume that some of these companies were under huge 
pressure to perform and consequently would exert significant pressure on 
auditors to allow them to hit their earnings targets.  One auditor noted that 
some start-ups are only able to pay their audit fees if an IPO succeeds or 
bank financing comes through.  This clearly could place unusual pressure 
upon auditors to ensure that the numbers were favorable to the company’s 
investors.  
 
 Some suggested that it would be wiser to focus on companies with greater 
then normal growth rates, who are trying to distinguish themselves by being 
acquisitions intensive.  
 
In summary, there was a tendency to believe that mid caps were not much 
different from large cap companies, where issues affecting auditor 
independence were concerned.  However, smaller cap companies, especially 
start-ups, were seen to present some unique challenges, which may require 
more guidance.    
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C. KEY SEGMENT DIFFERENCES 
As the various sections of this report have noted, the audience segments for this 
study had different perspectives on a number of matters.  This section of the report 
will summarize in one place the nature of these differences. 
CEO’S 
 This was a more homogeneous group of CEO’s then was interviewed in the initial 
phase.  Most felt that the quality and reliability of financial statements were quite 
high, despite the constant struggle to find the appropriate balance between 
meaningful disclosure and the need to protect competitive advantage. 
 They shared a sense that the demands for information were growing both in 
terms of the amount of detail and time sensitivity being required by regulators 
and the market.  
 They felt that standards of corporate governance were rising and that this had 
generally led to stronger relationships with outside auditors.  They acknowledged 
that a degree of rapport with the auditor was necessary and beneficial.  
 Some felt that there was not a real problem of auditor independence, but that 
there was a growing perception issue, that should be addressed.  They 
understood perceptions of auditor independence to be critical to the overall 
health of the financial system, and felt poor perceptions could be extremely 
damaging, whether real or not. 
 
KEY FINDING 
CEOS SAY REPORTING IS IMPROVING, PERCEPTIONS UNDER PRESSURE 
 Relationships with auditors are valued, work well, abuses rare 
 But consolidation of accounting firms, rising scrutiny raises stakes 
 Not expert on safeguards, lack a clear consensus on how best to proceed 
 Internet companies seen as a particular challenge 
 
 Some raised concerns about the degree of consolidation in the accounting field, 
noting that they had very few choices among audit and consulting suppliers.  But 
others argued that the economies of size and collective experience meant that 
Big 5 firms provided a better, more reliable audit service.   
 Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board  July 2000 
- 18 - 
   EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH  
& COMMUNI CATI ONS 
 By far, the major focus of their concern was the purchase of consulting services 
from the auditing firm.  They were deeply concerned about the legal and ethical 
exposure created by having too significant a relationship with their audit firm, and 
often troubled by the issue of compensation to audit partners in such an 
instance.  Views about how best to approach the matter included: 
i. Many argued that the flexibility to procure consulting services from their audit 
firm should be reduced or even eliminated.  Many preferred to simply disallow 
their audit firm from bidding on consulting work. 
ii. Many felt that reliance on Chinese Walls was inadequate, but that mandating 
more fundamental separation of the audit and consulting services was 
impractical. 
iii. Several suggested that an increased reliance on disclosure and on review by 
audit committees might be the best available option. 
 CEO’s generally felt that the current pressure to manage earnings was huge, but 
that actual abuses were extremely rare.  They acknowledged that the real 
responsibility for meeting the street’s expectations lay with management and not 
the auditors.  They were sympathetic to the notion that it was neither cost 
effective nor possible to audit “down to the penny” and were disturbed by the 
perceived demands of analysts and the SEC that they and their auditors do so.  
 They suggested that some companies might be more susceptible to pressures on 
auditor independence.  These included Internet companies where there were 
issues of real accounting inconsistency and revenue recognition, smaller 
companies without the infrastructure to monitor their financials effectively, and 
newer companies engaged in IPO’s and second tranche offerings. 
Ultimately, the CEO’s felt that a combination of measures would be necessary to 
ease challenges of perception and reality.  They saw the need for clearer guidance in 
some areas, and perhaps some new safeguards but fundamentally felt that “you 
can’t legislate morality”.  Most saw the tone set at the top of accounting firms as 
crucial to maintaining independence.  Audit committees were seen as an important 
tool but one that should not supplant the role of management.  Virtually all agreed on 
the need for strong sanctions, so that when and if there was a breach of 
independence rules, severe penalties would apply.   
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CFO’S 
This group was again fairly homogeneous on some issues, and showed clear 
divergence on others.   
 They were largely unconvinced that auditor independence was under real 
pressure, but they did feel that there were perception problems and that this was 
a troubling development.  
 CFO’s generally saw their relationship with their auditors as helpful, but more as 
“a validation of what management was doing” than as a value-added.  While they 
thought the quality of the financial statements was high, they also acknowledged 
that both the quantity of information provided and the degree of accompanying 
“spin” made them less relevant to investors then they once were.  
 A number raised concerns about the degree of consolidation in the accounting 
field, noting that fewer firms meant fewer choices.  Others noted that the “Big 5” 
had become so big, that it was more difficult to effectively manage and police 
independence issues.  But others argued that size was a safeguard of 
independence, since no one client was so important as to jeopardize the firm’s 
reputation.   




CFOS SAY REALITY FINE, PERCEPTIONS MORE TROUBLING 
 Audits seen to validate management efforts, more than add value 
 Consolidation of accounting firms raises challenges 
 Wanted flexibility, but showed instinct to restrict relationships with auditors 
 Internet companies seen as a particular challenge 
 
 Many resented any pressure to buy consulting services from their audit firm and 
were troubled by the sense that engagement partners might be becoming 
“account managers”.  
 Many felt that Chinese Walls provided some protection but an equal number saw 
them as being too porous to be effective. Competitive bidding and close 
monitoring of consulting assignments were seen as more helpful. 
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 Earnings management was acknowledged as a reality of current market 
conditions, but most CFOs felt that the SEC was exaggerating the extent of the 
problem.  Indeed many seemed to feel that “auditors were becoming fall guys” 
and that while the pressure on companies to meet expectations were real, most 
auditors were only exercising their professional judgement within GAAP.  
 Most did feel that some companies were more open to issues of auditor 
independence.  Most frequently cited were Internet companies where issues of 
valuation, revenue recognition, costs of goods sold and fulfillment costs posed 
unique challenges.  Most felt that once “the street” started to focus more on 
bottomline rather than topline revenues, these issues would be self-correcting. 
CFO’s as a whole were deeply concerned about perception issues but felt that it was 
important to ensure that a “reasonableness” test was applied in considering 
safeguards.  They favored a combination of both avoidance and management 
safeguards.  The majority favored rulemaking which stressed best practices over 
bright lines, fearing a tendency to put in place rules that were too narrow, restrictive, 
and ultimately counterproductive.  
AUDITORS  
As a group, auditors were fairly homogeneous in their views. 
 The general sentiment was that the quality of audits was improving over time, as 
audit firms became more expert, and more able to bring a broader set of skills to 
bear on behalf of a particular client.  
 At the same time, many felt that the growing complexity of the financial reporting 
requirements raised costs and reduced the utility of financial statements for 
many investors. 
 Most observed that the quality and reliability of financial statements was more a 
function of the corporate culture than the size of the auditee.  But a minority 
expressed a view that the financial reporting of larger companies tended to be of 
higher quality in part due to their greater degree of internal controls.  
 Sectoral differences were seen as important in that the technical complexity of 
the audit might be greater in sectors where the accounting practices were 
relatively untested (the technology sector) or where longer term procurement 
contracts made booking revenues more problematic (the aerospace industry).  
 Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board  July 2000 
- 21 - 
   EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH  
& COMMUNI CATI ONS 
KEY FINDING 
AUDITORS SAY AUDITS IMPROVING, AMOUNT OF DETAIL COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
 Corporate culture matters to independence more than size of auditee 
 New sectors raise issues where accounting practices are less tested 
 Relationships seen as professional and well balanced 
 But concerns about perceptions may mean tougher sanctions needed 
 
 Auditors saw their relationship with client companies as highly professional and 
well balanced.  Many indicated that their clients valued their ability to “push 
back” but some others acknowledged that the pressure to meet street estimates 
was causing somewhat greater tensions with clients.  Many felt that smaller to 
mid sized firms tended to be more reliant upon the auditor for advice.  This was 
seen as equally true of “start-up” companies, particularly in the “new economy” 
sectors, where management financial expertise was not always as strong.  
 All shared the view that there was no significant rise in the incidence of 
impairment.  But most said that the pressures on independence perceptions, 
triggered by the growth of consulting services and by the debate about earnings 
management, were growing.  
 Virtually all shared a view that the pressures to meet earning estimates were 
inordinate and a function of insatiable expectations by investors. A number felt 
that they were being thrust into the role of investment analysts and resented 
dealing with what they viewed as the irrational expectations of the market.  At the 
same time, very few felt that the pressure to meet street estimates translated 
into independence impairments on the part of auditors.  
 Auditors differed somewhat in their perception of the effect of consulting services 
on independence issues.  Many saw consulting services as a relationship building 
tool which provided significant value-added to the client and auditor alike.  But 
others expressed a concern that the rise of multi-disciplinary services imposed a 
real cost to and effected a cultural shift within the firm. 
 Auditors felt that as a group they were properly trained and coached to maintain 
the state of mind required providing proper attest services.  But many 
acknowledged that the size of large audit firms made it more challenging to 
model and maintain appropriately behavior.  Others pointed to the lack of 
financial and human resources within smaller firms to accomplish this important 
task.  
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 Most auditors felt that the degree and proliferation of media coverage and the 
regulatory community itself had exaggerated the issues of independence and 
audit failures.  But they acknowledged that the perception of independence 
issues was growing, at least within these two audiences and that those 
perceptions needed to be addressed. 
 It was clear that perception issues were critical to the majority of auditors.  Once 
again, the notion that “integrity is the commodity which an audit firm sells” was 
key.  But there was considerable debate on how best to deal with perception 
problems.  Many argued that it was impossible to meet the perception burden 
because it was unmeasurable.  Others suggested that perhaps an objective 
definition of perception, not unlike the “reasonable man” test, might be 
necessary. 
 Auditors were concerned that they might have to consider altering their business 
model, simply to avoid a perception problem, when the reality was that there was 
no impairment.  Indeed many argued that additional rules and “over-regulation” 
would make it even more difficult to attract and retain young people to the 
auditing practice.  At the same time, most auditors felt that the independence 
safeguards need to reflect a balance between avoidance and remediation.  
Auditors felt that the tone established at the top of their firms and the use of 
internal review and governance procedures were the most effective way to deal 
with impairment issues.  
In summary, relative to the previous phase of research, there seemed to be a 
heightened view among this sample of auditors, that additional measures might be 
necessary and helpful in defusing perception challenges.  Preferred actions included 
a clarification and modernization of some of the rules, publication of best practices, 
and an expanded role for Audit Committees and education of investors about current 
safeguards.  Many were willing to support more severe sanctions or remedies, when 
and if actual incidences of impairment occurred, in large part to deal with the 
perception issues. 
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRS 
This segment was fairly homogeneous in its views.   
 Most felt standards of financial reporting and of corporate governance had 
improved over time.  They felt that Audit Committees had greater importance, 
and were more probing and diligent than before.   
 Most audit chairs saw themselves as having a private and professional 
relationship with the audit firm.  They speculated that relationships might vary 
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according to the size and culture of the audit firms.  One argued vigorously that a 
fundamental conflict of interest resided in the fact that the company pays the 
auditors for the attest function.  Another suggested that audit firms were doing a 
poor job in managing their reputation, especially in the key area of auditor 
independence.  
 Generally, there was a consensus that the actual number of impairment 
problems was probably not increasing, but that perception problems were 
growing, something that this group found troubling.  
 
KEY FINDING 
AUDIT CHAIRS SEE IMPROVEMENTS, FEEL WELL SUPPORTED 
 Impairment problems not growing, perception a matter of rising concern 
 Non-audit services the biggest challenge, most prefer to avoid the scenario 
 Expectations are that separation will be inevitable 
 Most welcome more tools, support, guidance 
 
 Most argued that the sale of consulting services by the auditing firm was the 
most problematic factor in perception terms, but there was little consensus on 
how best to deal with the issue.  Some felt Chinese Walls were inadequate, while 
others suggested that firms had a massive incentive to make them work.  Most 
agreed that if the awarding of consulting contracts to the audit firm had a 
material impact on the audit partner’s compensation, this was inappropriate. 
 Most felt that the SEC or the market itself would effectively force a separation of 
the audit and consulting sides of accounting firms.  In the interim, a fair number 
felt that the sale of consulting services by the auditing firm to auditees should 
simply be avoided. 
 The issue of earnings management troubled this group less, since they viewed it 
more often as a manipulation of expectations, than earnings.  They felt that 
management was under enormous pressure to meet earnings estimates leading 
many companies to adopt aggressive accounting practices.  Nevertheless, many 
noted that meeting the short-term expectations game did not change the 
fundamental value of companies.  
 Some cited specific factors that they felt were more challenging than others, 
including: recognition of good will, value in kind, the competition for capital on the 
part of smaller companies, cost of goods, in-process R&D and revenue 
recognition.  
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 Most audit chairs agreed that the role and standards of audit committees 
needed to be strengthened, but many noted that they had no desire to assume 
the role of management.  These respondents worried that the additional time 
commitment and legal exposure such an expansion of powers and 
responsibilities implied would have a chilling effect on their desire and ability to 
function effectively. 
 Generally, they favored an enhanced role for audit committees, fuller disclosure 
practices, greater clarification of current guidelines, publication of best practices 
to help provide guidance in new areas, and general principles rather than bright 
lines.  Virtually all these respondents were looking for practical tools to help 
adjudge on these difficult issues.  Some suggested a materiality matrix would be 
useful.   
The audit chairs generally favored safeguards that combined both avoidance and 
remedial measures.  Once again, there was a strong consensus that to be more 
effective, rules needed to be more clearly enforced.  Many audit chairs stressed the 
need for meaningful sanctions, applied when necessary. 
BUY SIDE ANALYSTS 
Buy side analysts were not as homogeneous a group.  Certainly those who had 
previously worked as auditors were again influenced positively by that experience.  
But real differences emerged in the analyst’s assessment of the magnitude of the 
problem and the appropriate means to address the issues of auditor independence. 
 Once again, analysts tended to be more skeptical about auditor independence 
then other respondents.  While they were generally of the view that most financial 
reporting could be trusted, they also identified wide variances in the quality of 
audited financial statements.  These variances were seen as a function of the 
management style, longevity, size and the strength of control and information 
systems of the company itself. 
 While some believed that the amount and quality of financial disclosure had 
improved over time, others suggested it had changed for the worse, citing 
restructuring charges as one specific area of abuse. 
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KEY FINDING 
BUY SIDE ANALYSTS MORE SCEPTICAL, BUT NOT OVERLY TROUBLED 
 Audited statements declining in value over time 
 Role of auditor has problems, but other issues are more significant 
 Some accounting practices raise ire, but focus is not independence per se 
 
 Once again many analysts argued that the audited statements were of 
modest and declining importance, especially compared to more time-
sensitive sources of data, and many noted the cost-cutting on audits as 
evidence of their diminishing value. 
 Most tended to see the “typical” relationship between auditors and clients as 
acceptable, although they frequently cited incidents of abuse. There was a 
general view that the relationship was subject to corruption, because it was a 
financial one, but that this potential was common in the financial markets, 
and worse in relation to other players than with regard to auditors. 
 As a group, they were uncomfortable by the impact of consulting services upon 
the traditional audit practice.  Most sensed a real cultural shift within accounting 
firms which rendered auditors “more value-added players than policemen”. 
 Virtually all worried about what they saw to be the inevitable and negative impact 
of linking audit partners compensation to consulting services.  There was little 
consensus about whether “Chinese Walls” were an effective safeguard against 
abuse, with a minority suggesting that only a total separation of audit and 
consulting services would guarantee independence.   
 They recognized the phenomenon of earnings management as real but not 
particularly new or noteworthy.  They acknowledged that the bull market was 
creating enormous pressures upon companies to meet the street’s estimates.  
But they were less troubled by the notion of earnings management placing undue 
pressures upon auditor independence, stating that the SEC had overstated the 
problem and that accounting principles were sufficiently and appropriately 
flexible to manage expectations, not to permit fraud. 
 They were able to differentiate company types which they viewed with a greater 
potential to experience auditor independence issues.  Technology companies 
were cited frequently, especially with regards to the capitalization of “in-process” 
R&D.  Companies which required significant estimates of profitability, due to a 
reliance on long term procurement contracts where accrual estimates are 
necessary, were also identified.  
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Even though they minimized the impact of financial statements, the analysts agreed 
that perception was critical to an efficient capital market.  And while they sensed that 
the rules needed updating, there was little consensus on how to achieve a beneficial 
result.  Many worried that “over-regulation” would drive good people out of the 
profession.  But there was a strong sense that however the rules were changed, the 
current enforcement penalties were not stringent enough.  
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D. FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS 
A total of 8 focus groups were conducted in four different locations (San Francisco, 
Boston, Austin, and Chicago).  The participants in these focus groups were selected 
on the basis of several criteria: 
 
 That they had purchased stock in public companies in the last year. 
 That they did research of some sort personally about the companies whose 
stock they might buy or sell. 
 That they were the type of investor who typically held stock for longer periods 
of time, at least a year. 
Using this selection criteria, the intent was to explore the perceptions of what 
might be termed “reasonable investors”, that segment of the retail marketplace 
whose views on the role of auditor could be helpful in considering guidelines in 
the future. 
The interview guide used in these focus groups was similar to the interview guide 
employed in the one on one interviews conducted among elite audiences.  To 
some degree, it was necessary to reduce the amount of detail, and to probe 
fewer complex concepts.  Nonetheless, we are confident that the findings will 
prove of interest, and take comfort in the fact that they were consistent across 
the cities where the groups were held. 
INVESTORS RESEARCH HABITS 
At the outset of the groups, participants were asked to talk about the ways in 
which they approached the question of how to choose which companies to invest 
in, or when to sell stock they already held.  The key findings can be summarized 
this way: 
1. The participants confirmed early in the discussions that they tended to have 
modest sized portfolios (the older, the larger) and that their orientation was 
long term.  Many said that they had bought a number of stocks over the years 
but had little if any experience selling stocks.  They gravitated towards long 
established companies, but also were involved in technology issues, leaning 
towards the more established of these companies.  They recognized that 
stocks were volatile, but likely the best way to ensure the long-term growth of 
their money. 
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2. Most people reported using a number of different techniques to help them 
decide upon their investments.  Among the most frequently mentioned 
sources of information were: 
 Print publications such as Money, Worth, Investors Business Daily, etc. 
These were generally thought to be useful ways of getting access to a 
large amount of information in a format that is easily digested.   
 Watching television programming such as that on CNBC and CNN.  
Television coverage of market activity was primarily used not for long term 
planning but for monitoring performance, although most said that they 
listened to what prominent analysts said were their favorite stock picks, 
and might consider doing more research on those companies. 
 
 Following the opinions and picks of analysts.  These were considered to 
be the most important single source of investment advice.  People gained 
access to analyst views in a number of different ways, including via their 
brokers, from media sources, and from on-line free or subscription 
services.  In offering their views on analyst information, participants were 
quick to point out that they understood their vulnerabilities, but they felt 
that the typical analyst was in a better position than others to provide 
objective, detailed analysis of a company’s prospects. 
 
 Consulting friends, family and colleagues: While this was not considered 
the most reliable source of guidance, it was clearly the most widely 
practiced behavior.  Most of those interviewed said that they had one or a 
small handful of trusted friends, or relatives, who they felt knew a fair bit 
about the market, and could be counted on for some combination of hot 
tips and conservative counsel. 
 
 Consulting a broker or financial adviser: Most of those interviewed had 
currently, or had in the past, a broker with whom they dealt.  However, a 
relatively small number of people cited retail brokers as a valuable source 
of information, except as a conduit for gaining access to a brokerage’s 
research services.  
 
CONSUMERS RELY ON MANY SOURCES, LOOKING FOR BUY IDEAS 
 Many different media are utilized, Internet quite heavily 
 Past performance, familiar names and products part of screen 
 Established companies preferred, tech companies included in mix 
 Analyst views are important, sourced a number of ways 
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 Using a variety of Internet-based techniques: including engines like 
Yahoo, corporate websites, brokerage or fund company websites, and 
self-help sites like Motley Fool.  A considerable number of those 
interviewed were using the Internet, and most were enthusiastic about its 
potential to help them make informed decisions.  Again, the main tactic 
they used to filter the information was to rely more on past stock 
performance, companies that were generally known to them, and the 
views of senior analysts from institutions that they were familiar with.  A 
small number of those interviewed reported visiting chat centers to 
discuss and hear views about stocks, but for most this was not all that 
appealing.  
 
 Subscribing to newsletters such as Kiplinger’s.  A minor, but not miniscule 
proportion of those interviewed said that they had availed themselves of 
the services of newsletters to help guide their decisions.   
 
 Visiting libraries to review published materials.  Some, especially those 
who were retired or semi-retired, said they took advantage of public 
libraries to access a wide range of publications and databases (e.g. 
EDGAR).   
 
3. Most people felt that there was an abundance of information and sources of 
information about companies that one could invest in.  The participants 
seemed to appreciate this abundance, and mostly enjoyed the challenge of 
investing wisely.  While most felt somewhat uncertain about the health and 
direction of the market today, they seemed to be fairly sanguine about the 
longer-term prospects for performance.   
4. With few exceptions, the information that people focused on in deciding on 
buying opportunities did not include the audited financial statements of 
companies.  Instead, people cited the following kinds of information: 
 Management’s views and comments about past successes and business 
strategy going forward.  For people who are considering a long-term 
investment in a company’s stock, there is interest in (and often a high 
degree of confidence in) the company’s CEO and senior management.  
Hence, news stories quoting their views, television interviews, etc, carry 
some weight, even though participants perceive that the role of the CEO is 
to help boost the stock, and present the company in the most flattering 
light possible. 
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 The stock’s track record of positive performance, combined with a sense 
of whether it was currently under-priced given its performance.  Despite 
warnings (of which people seemed generally aware) there was a strong 
tendency to look at the track record of the company, in terms of profit 
growth, and at its track record of meeting or exceeding analyst profit-per-
share estimates.   
 
 The views of analysts about the company’s prospects.  In general, 
analysts were judged to be pretty expert and more closely aligned with the 
interests of average investors than other stakeholders were.  There was 
little distinction made between buy side and sell side analysts, and no 
real consideration of the impartiality of the views of the sell side firm.  
Instead, people seemed to rely on the notion that an analyst and their 
firm that recommended bad investments would pay a price over time, and 
that therefore they would be much more inclined to make sound buy and 
sell recommendations. 
 
 The general image they have of the company, including any direct 
exposure they have to its products and services.  At least one or two 
people in each group said that they tended to buy companies with which 
they had a personal familiarity, as consumers of the company’s products 
or services.  They said they trusted their instincts about what were good 
products and services, and that companies which offered good products 
and services were going to do well and therefore have rising share values. 
 
CONSUMERS SEE ABUNDANT, HIGH QUALITY INFORMATION 
 Most acknowledge risks, accept longer term case for stocks 
 Few rely on audited statements, annual reports 
 News coverage much more powerful influence 
 Sense that analysts provide useful filter, on consumers’ behalf 
 Interest in management views, despite perceived role as stock promoters 
 
 In general, most people said they only looked at annual reports after they 
became shareholders, and then often only paid them scant attention.  If 
they did bother to go through them at all, people were more likely to focus 
on the MD&A section, rather than look through the audited financial 
statements.  Those who were using the statements were more likely to be 
wondering whether they should be selling the company’s stock than 
buying it.  It seemed fair to conclude from the nature of the comments 
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that few felt they were competent to understand most of what was 
contained in the financial statements, and simply looked at revenue and 
profit lines over time. 
 In discussing the various sources of information they used to make 
investment decisions, it was clear that people were aware of potential 
abuses, but were not particularly of the view that they were exposed to 
much risk of financial misstatements and investment misguidance.  The 
reasons behind this perception will be elaborated on in the next section of 
this report. 
In summary, the group of investors interviewed in this process thought they were 
well served with an abundance of information, from a wide variety of sources.  
The annual report of public companies is not a particularly widely used 
component, and the audited financial statements seem even less widely 
consumed, among the retail investor community. 
THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
The next stage of the interviews probed the extent to which retail investors felt 
that they could trust the information they accessed in making investment 
decisions, and the reasons for having greater or lesser levels of trust.  The 
findings are critical to setting the context for their subsequent views on 
objectivity and independence guidelines, and can be summarized as follows: 
1. Most people have a high level of trust in the financial information they access 
today.  While many of those interviewed were familiar with high profile 
examples of financial misstatements, the strong tendency was to see these 
as isolated incidents.  People went on to say that there were bound always to 
be such examples, and that investors couldn’t reasonably expect otherwise.  
When commenting on these cases, people also said that they felt that it was 
probably impossible to prevent people from committing fraud, but that the 
system seemed to be working to find it and deal with it post-hoc.  They felt 
some sympathy for those who had been victimized, but were doubtful that 
there were more important systemic issues to be addressed. 
2. This high level of trust is particularly interesting because it is not based on 
any shared understanding of the safeguards that help ensure the reliability of 
financial reporting.  Quite the opposite phenomena was in evidence: people 
have so much confidence that they don’t think it would be worth bothering to 
find out the details of these safeguards, and had never taken the opportunity 
to do so in the past.  
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CONSUMERS HAVE HIGH DEGREE OF TRUST IN FINANCIAL INFORMATION  
 Aware of abuses, but see them as isolated 
 Confidence not tied to knowledge of current safeguards 
 Assumption that checks and balances exist, are working 
 Regulators, analysts, larger investors enforce necessary discipline 
 Belief that most people are honest, including auditors and management  
 
3. When asked to explain the reasons for their confidence, a number of reasons 
were commonly cited: 
 An assumption that there were a huge number of checks and balances in 
the system, even if they weren’t able to list them in detail.  There was a 
feeling that the financial system had been in place for a long time, and 
was functioning quite well, and that this probably was the best evidence 
that their were healthy checks and balances.  Related to this was a view 
that large investors had much more at stake than the average retail 
investor, and that large investors would have forced the necessary 
discipline and rule-making to protect their own interests long before. 
 An assumption that most people were generally honest rather than 
dishonest.  Despite the acknowledgement that money can bend ethics, 
the majority of participants held fairly stubbornly to a positive view of 
human behavior.  They said that most auditors, with or without a system 
of safeguards and codes, would do an honest and objective job, because 
that was human nature.  Similarly, there was a feeling that most 
companies, particularly most big, long established companies would be 
inclined to report honestly on their situation, especially if there was any 
potential risk of future embarrassment associated with the use of 
aggressive accounting methods. 
 An assumption that the analysts whose views they monitored or followed 
would have reviewed and ensured the reliability of the numbers.  There 
was a clear feeling that analysts knew a great deal about the financial 
results of companies, and were probably well suited to spotting overly 
aggressive accounting approaches.  Related to this was a belief that large 
institutional investors were vigilant, and that their presence in the market 
helped protect smaller investors from abuses, because they deterred 
misrepresentations, and were more likely to spot attempts to manage 
numbers. 
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 When listing the factors contributing to their confidence in financial 
reporting, a few participants mentioned the fact that company financial 
reports were audited, but for most this seemed to be a somewhat vague 
concept.  As noted earlier, many investors rarely used annual reports, 
usually only after they had become shareholders and were mailed copies.  
Among those who did use the reports, the statements were something 
they said they “glanced” over.   
 Roughly half were more or less aware that auditors had reviewed the 
reports to ensure that they complied with generally accepted accounting 
rules (some had a passing familiarity with this phrase).  In general, 
participants said that they were much more likely to be paying attention to 
quarterly earnings reports, and other intermittent news and information 
about a company’s prospects.  They did not have any expectations that 
this information was audited or verified, but they did not express any real 
concern about the accuracy or reliability of the information either.   
In summary, most people express a high level of confidence in the accuracy and 
reliability of the financial information made available by public companies.  They 
attribute this reliability to a range of factors, among which the role of auditors is 
relatively low profile. 
PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITORS AND AUDITS 
Participants were then asked to offer their perceptions about the way in which 
auditors approached their work, and the way in which audits were conducted.  
The results were as follows: 
1. Most people had only scant impressions of how audits were conducted; 
however their impressions were largely positive in nature.  Some said they 
had noticed auditors in their workplace, and observed that they seemed 
diligent and thorough.  Most of those who had not ever had any first hand 
experience also seemed to share positive impressions. 
2. While few seemed to know much about how audits were done the tendency 
was to guess that it involved time-consuming, detailed checking of facts and 
figures.  They assumed that it cost a significant amount of money to have a 
proper audit done, and people seemed to feel that it was money likely well 
spent.  They assumed that the company had a strong interest in ensuring that 
its financial information was accurate, and that auditors were helpful to 
management in that respect. 
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CONSUMERS KNOW LITTLE ABOUT AUDITS, BUT ASSUME THE BEST  
 Done by small number of well known firms, concerned about reputation 
 Auditees seen as generally having an interest in accurate financials 
 Assumption that auditors are no more or less ethical than others 
 Belief that firm matters more than individual qualities, in independence 
 Laws, criminal/civil penalties, accounting rules all seen as helpful 
 Codes, experience, training and resources all noted as well 
 
3. The common assumption was that audits of major companies were done by a 
small number of well-known firms.  The names of major audit firms were 
familiar to most people once somebody brought them up, but the level of 
familiarity was limited.  The largest firms, along with the largest public 
companies, were generally judged to be more stringent and reliable in their 
approaches to financial reporting.  Some went so far as to say they would 
have doubts about a company that was audited by an “unknown” firm.   
4. Most people did not really see auditors as people possessed of unusually 
high ethical standards, even though they believed that they were ethical.  
They offered the view that most people were honest and ethical, and that 
auditors were no more or less ethical than any other group in society.  They 
did not expect or demand that auditors meet a higher ethical test than other 
people were asked to meet. 
5. There was a tendency to believe that the audit firm had more to do with the 
level of independence and objectivity than the individual auditor did.  This 
was not to discount the role of the auditor, but really was an expression of 
confidence that audit firms were extremely concerned for safeguarding their 
reputation, and that if they weren’t the pressures on individual auditors 
would be of much more concern.  To some degree, people also speculated 
that audit staff might often be more junior in rank, less experienced, and 
therefore somewhat more vulnerable to pressure.  As such, people wanted to 
believe, and did, that the audit firms had measures in place to mitigate such 
pressures and protect reputation. 
6. When asked to list the factors that contributed to auditor objectivity and 
independence, the following list of suggestions emerged from participants: 
 The role of laws, regulations and oversight bodies such as the SEC.  While 
most of the people in the groups were wary of over-regulation, they 
seemed to feel that the level of oversight was appropriate in this field, 
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even if they were unfamiliar with the details.  The SEC was a familiar 
name, and people had a rough idea of what it was meant to do, but there 
was no real awareness of its advocacy on issues, including those related 
to auditor independence.  It was seen as more of a “policing” arm of the 
federal government. 
 The fear of criminal and civil penalties for wrongdoing.  People were 
aware that companies and their auditors had been sued by investors in 
the past, and felt this would happen again in the future.  While people 
were not enthusiastic about the role of litigation, they did feel that the 
threat of financial and other penalties was a helpful deterrent.  
 The fear of negative publicity and a loss of firm reputation.  Even more 
than the fear of civil and criminal penalties, participants seemed to think 
that the question of reputation mattered a lot in ensuring accurate and 
appropriate financial reporting.  They reasoned that those who wanted to 
be successful in the financial and business arena couldn’t afford to gain a 
reputation for misleading investors, and that it was only a small number 
who would trade short term gains, for longer -term failure.  There was an 
unspoken, but clear, assumption that no one could get away with 
misstatements over a prolonged period of time.  The profile of cases that 
participants were aware of made them think that malfeasance was being 
caught, rather than assuming that there were many more cases going 
unchecked. 
 The value system of the people involved.  Most people sensed that the 
value system was a very important part of what made financial reporting 
reliable.  But it was clear that they were not making a distinction between 
the value system of auditors and auditee management, or others.  
Instead, they were offering a more blanket assertion that they were 
inclined to trust rather than distrust others in society. 
 The culture within the audit firm.  As noted earlier, people didn’t know 
much about the culture within audit firms, but they felt that it was an 
important part of ensuring objectivity, and they guessed that it was being 
properly cultivated, at least among the largest firms.  Some appeared to 
feel that this aspect of the culture might have deteriorated a little bit over 
the years, but only as part of a slight, broader deterioration in societal 
commitment to such principles. 
 The role of “generally accepted” accounting standards.  Probably no one 
could explain what this term meant in detail, but a fair number had a 
general understanding of the concept.  Their assumption was that these 
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standards, rules or principles served two functions: to make it easier to 
identify misstatements, and to make it easier for investors to make 
“apples to apples” comparisons when it came to investment choices. 
 Professional codes of conduct.  Without knowing the details, most 
participants assumed that auditors followed a detailed and helpful code 
of conduct governing the profession.  They also imagined that this code 
contained sanctions for inappropriate behavior and that these sanctions 
worked as a useful deterrent. 
 Experience of auditors, and their firms.  The general view was that the 
task of auditing was complicated and likely becoming more complicated 
all the time.  Consequently, most judged that good auditors needed to 
have experience, and needed to be able to draw on experienced support 
within their firms.  They reasoned that less experienced auditors might be 
more susceptible to pressure from auditees, or less certain about how to 
respond to it. 
 Adequate training and resources to do the job well.  Most people 
assumed that an annual audit was a task that required a significant 
commitment of resources, and they guessed that if auditors felt that their 
efforts were not properly resourced, they would be less committed to 
doing a thorough job.  Few had any sense that auditees had put pressure 
on audit fees, but when the subject came up in discussion, the tendency 
was to believe that this trend could be unhelpful. 
7. When asked to list the kinds of factors that might compromise objectivity and 
independence, participants suggested the following: 
 The presence of a financial interest in or dependence on the auditee.  
Even though this came up quickly as a potential area for concern, upon 
discussion it was clear that people did not perceive a problem of this 
nature today.  More often, they reasoned that this was a logical matter to 
be concerned about, given the role of the auditor on behalf of the 
shareholder, and the nature of the audit firm’s business interests and 
strategies. 
 Too close a personal relationship between the auditor and auditee.  Here 
again, many people felt that this was an area of potential difficulty, not 
just in auditing, but in many other business relationships.  They said that 
there was no simple or perfect answer, but policies that encouraged 
sensitivity to the matter were welcomed. 
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 Pressure by companies to meet or exceed market expectations.  Most of 
these investors felt that companies were under very intense pressure to 
beat analysts earnings estimates or pay a heavy price in terms of stock 
valuations.  On the whole, people did not seem to think that this was a 
problem, although the volatility of stock prices did create some 
discomfort.  Most reasoned that some companies might react to this 
pressure by putting extra pressure on their auditors, but they felt that this 
would be the minority, and that the auditors would successfully resist the 
pressure, especially if it was on “big” items or issues. 
 
CONSUMERS SEE MANY RISKS TO INDEPENDENCE, BUT CONCERN IS MUTED  
 Financial interest, personal relationships, market pressures all noted 
 Human nature of small minority seen as most frequent cause 
 Prevention and remedial safeguards useful, but won’t always work 
 Acceptance that some abuse will happen, consumers must be wary  
 
 The human nature of a minority of people.  Perhaps more than any other 
cause, participants felt that earnings misrepresentation was a function of 
a handful of bad people.  They said that it was simply inevitable that in 
any large population, some would be inclined to act in a fraudulent 
manner, and that while prevention and remediation efforts were 
necessary, not all attempts would be prevented, and not all cases would 
be unearthed.  There was a sense that auditors did the best they could to 
minimize these risks. 
8. Participants were asked whether the “typical” relationship between an 
auditor and an auditee was “collegial and professional”, “cool and distant” or 
marked by “tension or friction”.  Most people felt that it was closer to “cool 
and distant” and felt that this was the way it should be.  They had no doubt 
that there were friendly relationships, especially at the most senior levels of 
the two organizations, but they didn’t feel that these compromised the work 
that the auditors did.  They asserted that the day-to-day contact of the 
engagement team with the auditee was probably less than “friendly”, but 
they didn’t feel that there was lots of friction or tension.   
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MOST ASSUME AUDITOR-AUDITEE RELATIONSHIP APPROPRIATE  
 Few have any detailed knowledge, but don’t fear the worst 
 Assume companies trying to put best face forward, but rules limit flexibility 
 Assume that senior levels are friendly, but not inappropriately so 
 Assume day to day contact during audit is cool, but not tense  
 
9. In general, people felt that it was normal for companies to be trying to put the 
best face forward in their financial statements, but that the leeway was 
reasonably narrow given the accounting rules and the scrutiny of outsiders 
including the auditors.  They guessed that the circumstances where auditors 
were put under intense pressure by the auditees were few and far between, 
perhaps more common in new companies, especially technology companies. 
In summary, most participants expressed confidence in the way in which auditors 
approached their work, believing it to be thorough, competent and objective.  
They sensed that there were risks, and identified many of the more widely 
debated ones, but they believed that there were counterweights that served to 
minimize these risks. 
PROBING ON RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 
As the discussion groups progressed, probing began to focus on some of the 
core elements of the debate about auditor objectivity and independence, and to 
explore these in slightly more detail.  Participants were probed about the 
potential impact of a number of items on auditor objectivity and independence.  
The key findings were as follows:  
1. Evolution of audit firms into consulting firms: most people felt that the fact 
that accounting firms had branched out into other service areas, in addition 
to auditing, posed no challenge to the objectivity and independence which 
they brought to auditing.  A small handful thought that there might be some 
potential improvement in the quality of the work they were doing, as they 
gathered a broader array of experience, but most people sensed little 
connection. 
2. Offering non-audit services to audit clients: this subject provoked a fair bit of 
debate and some discomfort among participants.  A fair number of people 
(almost half) felt that there was something unsettling about the idea of an 
audit firm doing additional work for the auditee, but they weren’t sure that 
banning this type of activity really made sense.  For the most part, people felt 
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that the idea of separate consulting and audit divisions as well as other 
safeguards would help mitigate any risk.  It was clear that while most people 
had never really thought about the role of auditors, and were not really 
concerned about the reliability of financial information, this specific issue had 
the potential to raise some concerns in the minds of a notable minority of 
people.  Certainly, the impression left was that people would be more 
comfortable with a world where this practice did not occur, but that most 
people would not demand or press for such a context. 
 
PROVISION OF NON AUDIT SERVICES TO AUDIT CLIENTS UNSETTLES SOME 
 Few had considered the question before, views were soft 
 Most felt that status quo was probably ok, avoidance would be better 
 Walls seen as helpful, but only with other safeguards 
 Tone at the top seen as critical, most assume the best  
 
3. Physical/financial separation of business units: The idea of maintaining 
physical and financial separation between the audit and non-audit units of 
the firm was something that helped provide people with a measure of 
assurance.  However, it was seen as one of several safeguards that would be 
satisfactory in combination, not sufficient on its own.  While people had some 
doubts that the firms’ divisions would not broach the walls, most people 
nevertheless thought it was a worthwhile safeguard. 
4. Tone at the top: It was interesting to note that most people sensed that this 
was a very important part of ensuring objectivity and independence.  They 
believe that strong signals from senior management have an impact today, 
provided that incentives and penalties are aligned with the sentiments 
expressed.  Moreover, people felt that objectivity and independence had 
more to do with the determination of the firm to safeguard its reputation, 
than with the instincts and ethics of an individual auditor.  While almost 
nobody had any information about tone in major accounting firms today, they 
judged that the right signals were being sent, because of the firm’s need to 
protect its reputation. 
5. Competition among audit firms: There was a vague sense that audit firms 
were more competitive with one another than might have been the case in 
the past, but this was seen as no different from what had been occurring in 
other sectors of the economy.  Few put any credence in the notion that this 
heightened competition was having any impact on objectivity and 
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independence.  People grasped the theoretical pressure that could arise, but 
they doubted it arose often, and assumed that the firms’ concern for 
reputation would override any such pressure. 
6. More disclosure of safeguards: people thought that it couldn’t really do any 
harm for the various stakeholders involved to expend more effort to inform 
investors about the role of the audit, the auditor, and the independence 
safeguards.  At the same time, it was clear that to some degree this was a 
pro-forma answer: few could ever imagine that they would notice this 
information, or go out of their way to discover it.  They certainly felt that any 
publicity or advertising about this subject would go largely unnoticed and 
would be a waste of money, but they felt that stipulations in an annual report 
would probably be slightly helpful. 
 
FEW KNOW ABOUT SAFEGUARDS, INTEREST IN SUBJECT IS MUTED  
 Most were impressed with present safeguards  
 As people learned more, confidence rose 
 More disclosure of non-audit work generally valued as a deterrent 
 Some doubts about effectiveness of Audit Committees  
 
7. Disclosure of non-audit work: while the level of concern about auditors doing 
non-audit work for their audit clients was modest, most people liked the idea 
of requiring companies to disclose such activity.  This was a slightly tentative 
response, since people maintained their assertion that they generally trusted 
the stakeholders involved and didn’t want to set in place cumbersome 
regulations that implied a higher level of mistrust.   
On balance though, after discussing the matter a little, there was a feeling 
that disclosure might be a relatively painless way for companies to meet a 
perception test, and might serve as a deterrent to the minority that might act 
inappropriately.  The deterrent, they reasoned, would not lie in the fact that 
the average retail investor would note the information and respond 
accordingly, but that the institutional investors and analysts would take the 
lead. 
8. Peer review procedures: most people were surprised to learn of the peer 
review procedures in place, and a considerable minority thought they were 
vaguely inappropriate.  Their was a sense that the safeguard was perhaps 
unnecessary “overkill” in terms of protection for investors, and an intrusion 
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into reasonable privacy that could be expected by the audit firm and the 
company being audited.   
Some sensed that having your competitor review your work was an invitation 
to other types of trouble, even as it might help address questions about 
objectivity.  After discussion, it was apparent that most people didn’t really 
have strong views about the procedure, and were ready to accept the idea 
that it probably was acceptable, since audit firms seemed to be comfortable 
with the idea. 
9. Second partner review: Even though people recognized that second partner 
review was a concept that could be compromised, since both partners 
worked for the same company, there was a broad view that it was a helpful 
procedure.  Because people accepted that the firm wanted to protect its 
reputation, they accepted the notion that the firm would ask a second partner 
to help ensure the protection of that reputation, and they further accepted 
the fact that the second partner would play his or her assigned role properly.   
10. Required partner rotation: There was virtually unanimous approval for this 
procedure.  While almost no one had been aware that it existed, almost 
everyone felt that it was a useful safeguard, and the only debate centered on 
whether 7 years was an appropriate time frame.  Some thought it might be a 
little long, and wondered if five years might be better, but everyone accepted 
the notion that it was in everyone’s interest to have an auditor become 
experienced in doing a company’s audit, and have a period of time after that 
for the full benefits of that experience to be realized, before making a 
change.  
In endorsing this safeguard, it is important to note that people did not believe 
that the typical auditor would lose objectivity over time, but that it was more 
likely that familiarity would contribute to a slight lowering of vigilance, even if 
in no way deliberate or conscious.  Many people related it to their own work, 
and said that the more familiar they became with some of their own work 
assignments, the more their guard might come down from time to time. 
11. Stepped up role for the Audit Committee: while this idea was generally well 
regarded by elite audiences, it was met with a bit of indifference by the retail 
investors.  On the whole, after discussion, they thought that it would be 
helpful, but this conclusion was by no means automatic, nor particularly 
enthusiastic.  This reaction is mostly explained by the nature of the 
perceptions participants voiced about boards of directors.  Some saw board 
members as “captive” or “friends” of management, and they doubted that 
they would do much to upset an inappropriate relationship between auditor 
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and auditee management.  Others saw board members as not really close 
enough to the operations of the company to be a useful intervenor in such 
matters.   
12. Rules regarding investment: There was a vague awareness of the fact that 
there were rules prohibiting investments by audit firm personnel in the 
companies which the firm audited.  Most people assumed that these were 
sensible precautions, but after more detailed discussions about the nature of 
these prohibitions, as many as a third to a half felt that they might be 
excessively strict.  The rest maintained that even if they were overly strict, it 
might be best to keep them intact as it conveyed a tone and a principle that 
were important. 
13. Rules regarding relationships: Participants had a similar view on the 
safeguards that related to relationships.  On the one hand, there was a sense 
that they might be too rigid, but even though people had a high degree of 
confidence in human nature, they were somewhat reluctant to see too much 
loosening of any safeguards.   
14. Incentive compensation: Participants were asked about two concepts: the 
idea that relationship growth should be one factor affecting the 
compensation of auditors, and the idea that independent and objective 
audits should be rewarded in compensation discussions.  On the first 
question, most participants were decidedly uncomfortable with the idea that 
audit partners should receive any financial benefit when their firm sold more 
services to an auditee.  They felt that even if the amount was small, and even 
if relationship growth was only one component of many that affected 
compensation, there was a problem with the principle.   
On the second matter, people seemed to think it quite logical that auditors 
should be compensated for being objective and independent, but they were a bit 
quizzical about why or how “exceptional” performance in this area should be 
singled out and rewarded.  For some, it seemed as though auditors whose work 
was lacking in objectivity should not be auditors, rather than remain auditors, but 
be paid less than others.  On balance, people had no major problems with this 
idea, but didn’t immediately grasp the “upside” because they didn’t really have a 
concern about the motivation or performance of auditors to begin with. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
We believe it is possible to draw several conclusions based on these findings, and 
would focus attention on the following: 
Elite Audiences 
1. The addition of another 50 interviews to the roughly 120 conducted in the first 
phase should serve to bolster confidence in the results reported last year, since 
many of the broad findings were confirmed.  While the work remains essentially 
qualitative, we believe that the findings are highly reliable. 
2. Most of those interviewed feel very confident with the general standard of 
financial reporting and believe that auditors perform a necessary function in a 
way that reflects integrity, competence, and independence.  Worries abound, 
however, that the perception of the independence of the auditor is under 
increasing pressure, caused by broader participation and heightened media 
coverage of market events.  
3. Most feel that the pressure to meet earnings expectations is huge and growing, 
but that earnings management is not new, is often overstated, is largely 
manageable, and rarely has anything to do with the role of auditors per se.  The 
one major exception is in the technology sector, and in particular with respect to 
new players in that sector, where the room for interpretation is broad, the 
financial expertise within companies often thin, and the risks and rewards huge.  
4. The size of the audit firm and the size of the auditee are not seen as linked to 
independence and objectivity in any significant way, except in the case (more 
theoretical than real) of a mismatch between a huge client and a smaller audit 
firm, and where technology related start ups are involved (but the real issue there 
is less size than the nature of the business). 
5. Perceptions of independence are seen as critical, but there is little consensus as 
to how best to safeguard perception, whose perceptions should matter, and what 
cost should be entailed to achieve this objective.  No one believes that perception 
challenges can be solved easily, or by one set of measures.  Instead, there is a 
tendency to favor a combination of efforts: 
 A greater degree of separation of consulting and audit side services. 
 An increasing reliance on disclosure of the range and nature of the 
relationship between auditors and auditees.  
 A strengthened oversight role for audit committees. 
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 Increasing reliance on the tone set at the top of audit firms and the internal 
governance and compensation procedures to model appropriately 
independent behavior.  
6. Most are of the view that independence safeguards probably require some 
change, to deal with the evolution of the economy and the structure of the 
accounting industry. However the instinct for change was not borne of 
widespread, urgent anxiety, but more a sense of prudence and vigilance.  In this 
sample, auditors were least likely to feel a need for change, and analysts were 
most likely to take the opposite approach. 
7. Most feel that the ideal standards and safeguards should reflect a combination 
of anticipation and avoidance, mitigation and management of issues that arise, 
and tough penalties.  The tilt would be towards mitigation and management, 
combined with penalties that are tough enough to act as real deterrents, because 
of concerns that an over-reliance on “anticipation and avoidance” can become 
too burdensome and ultimately counterproductive. 
Investing Public  
1. Most had a high degree of confidence in the quality and reliability of the 
information that was available for them to use in making investment decisions.  
They used a wide variety of sources, assumed that all of them contained some 
degree of bias, and felt that they were capable of recognizing and factoring in 
these biases. 
2. Their confidence in the financial reporting system was largely based on the 
feeling that while the potential for abuse and fraud exists, there are many checks 
and balances that help keep the risk to an acceptable level, and that the vast 
majority of people were more inclined to be honest than dishonest, even when 
money was involved. 
3. The tendency was to see the role of the audit and auditors as one of many 
checks.  Few had any detailed knowledge of what an audit consisted of, or the 
safeguards to ensure that it was done in an independent fashion, but the 
tendency was to assume that auditors and auditees, more often than not, shared 
a desire to present accurate financial information. 
4. Few consumed the annual reports of companies they were considering investing 
in, and even fewer waded into the audited financial statements. Annual reports 
were more likely to be used to assess selling opportunities than buying 
opportunities, and the MD&A sections were more heavily relied on than any 
other.  The fact that auditors had reviewed the financials gave people comfort, 
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but there was no underlying sense of insecurity, despite the fact that most people 
could name some high profile problem cases in recent years.  
5. Very few people knew anything about the current safeguards to ensure 
independence on the part of the auditor, although they assumed that rules, fear 
of penalties, codes, etc. all formed part of the system.  The more people became 
informed about current safeguards, the more confident they became in the 
independence of the auditor. They were open to the idea that more safeguards 
might be needed, but were not agitating for these, nor were they overly interested 
in being communicated to about these matters in the future.   
6. Most people sensed that the relationship between auditor and auditee was 
appropriate, typically neither too close nor tension-ridden.  The one area of 
greater concern had to do with the provision of non-audit service to audit clients, 
where participants felt unsettled and discomfited.  Avoidance of this practice 
seemed to be preferred, but disclosure was seen as a helpful alternative step as 
well.  
7. Inherent in many of these comments was an acceptance of the fact of life that 
the relationship between the auditor and auditee could become corrupted, but 
that made it no different from a wide variety of other situations in which people 
place their trust everyday. In short, they were saying that they felt that the level of 
risk was modest, the track record was pretty good, and the checks and balances 
seemed to be appropriate and functioning reasonably well. Clearly, people would 
not argue against more safeguarding, but neither was this sample agitating for 
more protection. 
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APPENDIX A:  TESTING SPECIFIC SCENARIOS WITH ELITE AUDIENCES 
In the course of conducting these interviews, a number of scenarios were developed 
for use in focussing attention on the kinds of practical situations in which an 
independence issue might or might not arise.  These scenarios, and the responses 
which they generated, are summarized here.  Because of the complexity of these 
scenarios in the minds of the individual investor, they were not used extensively in 
the focus groups, and so the responses below are those of the elite one-on-one 
interviewees.   
 
SCENARIO I 
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop and install a new 
SAP computer system for their client, ACME Manufacturing.  ABC earns $10 million for the 
computer system work, and $1 million per year for their audit of ACME.  The consulting 
contract equals about 1% of ABC’s annual revenues.  
ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in competitive 
bidding, and the question of whether such a contract would impact the independence was 
raised with ACME’s audit committee, which decided that there was no impairment.  ACME 
management has the necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the 
necessary decisions around it. 
As with the first phase of research, the vast majority of interviewees did not perceive 
a real loss of independence in this situation.  But probably almost half felt that there 
was a risk of impairment, and certainly a risk of perceived impairment.  A number of 
factors would affect the level of risk. 
 The sheer size of the contract was seen as a potential perception challenge.  
While $10 million might be good value, observers might doubt that the audit firm 
would be willing to walk away from such a relationship, if necessary to protect the 
integrity of the audit.   
 The proportion of firm, office or partner income in relation to total billings to any 
single client was seen as relevant in real and perception terms.   
 The role played by the audit partner was deemed important: most felt that the 
auditor’s participation should stop at introduction. 
 The procurement process, including whether a competition was held, the Audit 
Committee was involved, and disclosure of the assignment is made.  
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 When asked to consider the same scenario where the consulting contract 
equaled 20%, rather than 1%, of the audit firm’s revenues (or the consulting 
arm’s revenues), most agreed that there would be both a significant degree of 
real and perceived risk.  Many suggested that a materiality matrix would be a 
useful tool for both management and audit committees in measuring risk.  
 Respondents in this phase were less confident in the ability of internal 
safeguards such as “Chinese walls”, or firewalls to minimize risk.  Auditees felt 
that they could probably mitigate risks with additional disclosure and oversight 
although they preferred not to want to do this very often.  Analysts shared 
concerns about the size and nature of the assignment, and felt current 
safeguards offer little or no guarantee of independence.  They were much more 
likely to push for disclosure as the best deterrent safeguard. 
 Increasing numbers of interviewees in this phase of research felt nothing short of 
a strict separation of the audit and consulting services would really mitigate the 
risk in such a situation.  They differed in how plausible or important they thought 
this to be. 
SCENARIO II 
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his annual audit of 
Kate Microchips Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of Chief Strategy Officer, with a 
rich compensation package.  Doe accepts, and his new position means that he is in regular 
contact with brokerage firms and their analysts, working to strengthen confidence in Kate. 
BBB immediately conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of Kate, makes sure it 
selects a senior partner to work on Kate’s audit in the future, to ensure proper skepticism, 
and schedules QA and Peer Review inspections for next year. 
 As was the case in the last wave of research, an overwhelming majority of 
respondents saw neither a real loss of independence nor an unacceptable risk to 
auditor independence in the future.  
 Most also agreed that the perception of reasonable investors would not be 
negatively affected in this situation, that this type of situation is highly common 
and quite productive from the standpoint of both the audit firm and the client. 
 Respondents were satisfied that the procedures taken by the individual and the 
audit firm were effective and important. 
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SCENARIO III 
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computer Warehouse, based in New York.  Ace’s 
Seattle office does some routine bookkeeping work for Moll’s four Seattle stores, which 
account for no more than 4% of Moll’s overall revenues, and would not normally be visited by 
an audit team. 
The bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of the Ace’ local 
office, which is separate from the audit department.  The work includes processing company-
supplied data, and then forwarded it to Moll’s headquarters in New York.  Ace personnel do 
not sign checks, have custody of assets or make significant judgements. 
 As with the last phase of research, there was a clear lack of consensus about this 
scenario.  Most again agreed that it probably did not pose a real problem of 
independence, but many worried that the question of bookkeeping assistance 
can be a difficult one which posed real risks to independence.   
 A number expressed concern that while this specific scenario was probably fine, 
similar activities could cause a shifting of management’s responsibilities to the 
audit firm, which was unacceptable.  
 There was a feeling that even if the work did not involve “significant” judgements, 
outside observers might doubt the auditor’s independence, if the firm’s staff was 
implementing accounting treatments which were likely to be a subject of dispute 
with the auditor down the road.  
 Auditors confirmed again that their firms prefer not to do any of this type of work 
because of concerns about how it might be perceived.  They felt that even if they 
could make the case about the routine and non-judgmental nature of the work, 
that participating in any aspect of internal accounting was better avoided.  
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SCENARIO IV 
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s Boston office.  She has 
two relatives who happen to work for two different Tendy clients.  
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer.  He has $8000 in Able’s stock 
option plan.  Jane and her husband earn a combined income of more than $200,000 per 
year. Able’s audit is done by Tendy. 
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly growing company in 
Portland Maine.  Portland is 120 miles from Boston, and all services for Simple are provided 
by Tendy’s Portland office. 
Jane has no involvement in either client’s account.  She sees her brother socially about once 
a year. 
 Responses to this scenario were virtually identical to our last phase of research.  
Once again it provoked a remarkably vigorous discussion.  
 Interviewees overwhelmingly sensed that no real impairment of independence 
had occurred with respect to either the brother or the husband.  Most felt that the 
relationship and distance rules should have significance only if Jane was involved 
in the audit itself.  But at the same time, respondents acknowledged that the 
perception issues were critical to Jane’s reputation, that of her firm, its clients, 
and the perceived integrity of the audits. 
 There was a widespread feeling current rules governing relationships are quite 
strict and may create an impediment to attracting and retaining new entrants to 
the profession.  This was especially true for interviewees who were involved with 
a “new economy” companies, particularly within the technology sector where 
stock options have become the main currency of employee compensation.  
 Some argued that they simply would not take the risk, since even “gray issues” 
can be problematic.  They felt that it was only appropriate that auditors be held to 
a higher standard than other participants in the financial community are, given 
the attestation function they perform.  They felt that any relaxation of rules, even 
admittedly archaic ones, might be perceived as a weakening of the commitment 
to independence. 
 The majority felt that application of sound personal judgement by the auditor was 
the best assurance of a high degree of independence when it came to personal 
relationships.  Most people were of the view that there was no substitute for 
general principles of conduct applied with personal judgement. 
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 Most people felt the auditor had a strong obligation to disclose any potential (real 
or perceived) conflict arising from personal relationships not just to their own firm 
but to their clients as well and that in these instances, “transparency” was the 
only meaningful protection.  The overriding assumption is that once disclosed, 
these relationship issues could be assessed on a case by case basis to 
determine whether they offended either the shareholders or management sense 
of propriety. 
 In an age of jet travel and instant Internet access, many interviewees signaled 
that the comfort provided by geographic separation was diminishing over time 
and that “distance rules” per se were meaningless.  Not surprisingly, this was 
particularly true for interviewees drawn from the technology sector.  
In summary, four scenarios were tested which explored a number of contemporary 
dimensions of the question of auditor independence.  In all but one case, there were 
mixed opinions, and a lack of consistency in how participants felt current guidelines 
could or would normally be applied.  This underscored a call for greater clarification 
and a hope for greater consistency over time, in how auditors and their clients set 
and meet the tests of independence.  This degree of uncertainty was highest when 
significant consulting relationships were at stake, and when personal relationships 
were involved. 
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APPENDIX B:  THE FOCUS GROUP GUIDE 
Can you tell me a little bit about how you decide what stocks to buy or sell, how much information 
you gather, what kinds of information do you use, and how do you get it? 
What is your overall impression of the information that companies make available to investors?  Is 
there enough, is it clear enough, is it information that you can trust? 
Can you talk to me about whether you use annual reports, and in particular, whether you examine 
the audited financial statements of the companies you consider buying or selling? 
What are your impressions about the audited financial statements? 
What is your impression about the role that auditors play? 
Is it your impression or understanding that auditors are independent and objective in carrying out 
their audits of companies whose stock is publicly traded? 
Why do you think that? 
What factors do you think are most helpful in ensuring that they are independent and objective? 
What factors do you think could have the potential to put that independence at risk? 
Are you familiar with the policies and procedures, often referred to as safeguards, which are in 
place to help ensure objectivity and independence. 
Do you believe that there are many situations that develop where independence is compromised? 
Can you describe any for me? 
Do you think independence has more to do with the auditing firm or more to do with the individual 
auditor working within the firm? 
Do you think that companies being audited tend to put pressure on their auditors in a way that 
could compromise independence, or do you think most companies tend to value the idea of 
having a truly independent audit to share with potential investors?  
What impact, if any, are/could the following things have on the independence and objectivity of 
auditors? (Explain how they would have an impact if you think that they would?)   
 The fact that audit firms generally now provide more consulting services in addition to doing 
audits, compared to the past. 
 The fact that audit firms sometimes now provide consulting services to their audit clients. 
 The competition for investment among companies 
 The way in which prices for stocks can be volatile lot based on whether the company exceeds 
or falls short of estimates of its earnings. 
 The quality of the people doing the audits 
 The values of the people doing the audits 
 The reputation of the firms doing the audits 
 The scrutiny of regulatory authorities 
 The business culture within audit firms 
 The business culture within client firms 
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 The competition among audit firms 
 The concern among audit firms of liability if their audit proves in error. 
 The concern among audit firms of adverse publicity 
In developing approaches to ensure auditor independence and objectivity, is it better to focus on: 
 Identifying situations which could be threats to independence and make sure that those 
circumstances are avoided.  
 Make sure that in those situations which have the potential to be threats to independence 
there are safeguards to make sure that independence is maintained 
 Making sure that there are strong penalties when independence is compromised. 
In your opinion, should the goal be to: 
 Ensure that reasonable people would not perceive a loss of independence, regardless of 
whether there has been one in fact, in order to maintain investor confidence in financial 
reporting 
 Ensure that no loss of independence has actually occurred, because it is impossible to 
completely guard against what perceptions people might have, or at least impossible to do so 
at a reasonable cost. 
Based on what you know, are current safeguards and prohibitions governing the relationship 
between audit firms and their clients appropriate or in need of change? 
Here are some examples of safeguards which are or could be used to help ensure independence. 
Would you comment on the usefulness of each. (Plain language explanations will be offered for 
each) 
 Physical separation/financial separation of audit and non audit services 
 Employee compensation that rewards the performance of quality audits 
 Stepped up role for Audit Committee 
 Disclosure to the public of independence safeguards and procedures 
 Tone at the top, leadership within firms 
 Required rotation of the audit partner every seven years. 
 Second partner review 
 Peer review procedures 
 Rules governing relationships 
 Rules governing investments 
 Controls within the firms, such as widespread policies, education, monitoring systems and 
consulting. 
Are there any other comments that you would like to make before we wrap up? 
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APPENDIX C:  THE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
CONTEXT 
In general terms, how would you characterize the quality and reliability of information shared by 
public companies with the investing public?  How has it changed? What caused it to change? 
How would you describe the relationship between most auditors and their audit clients?  What 
about your approach? 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Have you personally observed situations where the objectivity or independence of an auditor was 
impaired, or might be perceived as impaired? 
What are the circumstances or factors which are most likely to contribute to an independence 
concern?  
Is impairment of independence becoming more common or more rare?  What impact, if any are 
these factors having?  (Probes: the change in the balance of auditing versus consulting services 
provided by accounting firms, financial markets changing, technology, competition for capital, 
the cost of capital, consolidation, rules, regulations, safeguards, earnings management, analysts 
estimates, etc.) 
If one assumes that a guarantee of absolute independence is not possible, and a lack of 
independence is unacceptable, how important do you think it is for the standard setters to focus 
on each of the following? 
 On ensuring that circumstances which are threats to independence are avoided.  
 On ensuring that appropriate safeguards exist to manage those threats successfully. 
 How much emphasis do you think needs to be placed on preventive measures versus 
sanctions or penalties. 
In your opinion, should standards focus on the goal of: 
 Ensuring that no reasonable person might perceive a loss of independence, regardless of 
whether there has been one in fact. (in order to maintain confidence in financial reporting) 
 Ensuring that no loss of independence has actually occurred. (Because a perception burden 
in some cases, or among some people, may be impossible to meet, or impossible to meet at 
a reasonable cost) 
Do you think that the standards should be set on the basis of assuming that the point of audits is 
to ensure that financial statements are reliable, or that they are credible or both?  How should 
auditors and clients balance these priorities, and what is the role of standards in finding this 
balance? 
Based on what you know, are current safeguards and prohibitions governing the relationship 
between audit firms and their clients appropriate or in need of change? 
Thinking specifically about the field of business which your company is involved in, are there 
circumstances which you think pose a particular challenge in terms of maintaining a properly 
independent relationship between client and auditor.  (For example are there services or business 
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arrangements which your audit firm offers which might be appealing to your business, or to the 
firm’s clients, but might be perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as an independence issue?  Are 
there specific safeguards which exist or are needed for this particular sector? 
I’d also like to know whether you feel that the question of auditor independence is any different for 
companies which are mid-cap in size rather than large cap.  Can you describe any differences you 
see, and how they are taken into account in properly managing the auditor client relationship? 
In responding to the issues which we have just discussed, do you favor a bright lines, broad 
guidance, or a best practices approach, and why: 
Here are some examples of safeguards which are used to help ensure independence.  Would you 
comment on the usefulness of each. 
 Physical separation/financial separation of audit and non audit services 
 Stepped up role for Audit Committee 
 Disclosure to the public of independence safeguards and procedures 
 Tone at the top, leadership within firms 
 Internal review and governance procedures within audit firms and within the profession 
Other comments/thoughts: 
SCENARIO A 
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop and install a new SAP 
computer system for their client, ACME Manufacturing.  ABC earns $10 million for the computer 
system work, and $1 million per year for their audit of ACME.  The consulting contract equals 
about 1% of ABC’s annual revenues.  
ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in competitive bidding, 
and the question of whether such a contract would impact the independence was raised with 
ACME’s audit committee, which decided that there was no impairment.  ACME management has 
the necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the necessary decisions around 
it. 
 In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?  
 If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired? 
 Might reasonable investors, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial reporting of 
ACME?  Of the reliability of audited statements more generally? 
 Would your views change if the consulting contract equaled about 20% instead of 1% of 
ABC’s revenues?  Why/Why not? 
 Would your views change if the audit partner helped win this consulting contract, and as a 
result, is it likely to have a positive impact on the audit partner’s compensation by ABC? 
SCENARIO B 
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his annual audit of Kate 
Microchips Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of Chief Strategy Officer, with a rich 
compensation package.  Doe accepts, and his new position means that he is in regular contact 
with brokerage firms and their analysts, working to strengthen confidence in Kate. 
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BBB immediately conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of Kate, makes sure it 
selects a senior partner to work on Kate’s audit in the future, to ensure proper skepticism, and 
schedules QA and Peer Review inspections for next year. 
 In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?  
 If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired? 
 Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial 
reporting of Kate Inc.?  Of the reliability of audited statements more generally?  
 Would your views change if John Doe turned down the job, and continued working on Kate’s 
audits? 
 Are there other things, preventive or remedial, which could or should have been done in this 
scenario? 
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SCENARIO C 
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computer Warehouse, based in New York.  Ace’s 
Seattle office does some routine bookkeeping work for Moll’s four Seattle stores, which account 
for no more than 4% of Moll’s overall revenues, and would not normally be visited by an audit 
team. 
The bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of the Ace’ local office, 
which is separate from the audit department.  The work includes processing company-supplied 
data, and then forwarded it to Moll’s headquarters in New York.  Ace personnel do not sign 
checks, have custody of assets or make significant judgements. 
 In your view, do the actions taken in this scenario abide by or contravene current rules? 
 In this example, has there been a real loss of independence? 
 If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired? 
 Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial 
reporting of Moll Computer Warehouse?  Of audited statements more generally? 
 Would your views change if the stores which received the accounting assistance from ACE 
accounted for about 20% instead of 4% of Moll’s revenues? Why/Why not? 
SCENARIO D 
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s Boston office.  She has two 
relatives who happen to work for two different Tendy clients.  
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer.  He has $8000 in Able’s stock option 
plan.  Jane and her husband earn a combined income of more than $200,000 per year. Able’s 
audit is done by Tendy. 
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly growing company in 
Portland Maine.  Portland is 120 miles from Boston, and all services for Simple are provided by 
Tendy’s Portland office. 
Jane has no involvement in either client’s account.  She sees her brother socially about once a 
year. 
 In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?  
 If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired? 
 Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial 
reporting of either Able or Simple?  Of the reliability of audited statements more generally? 
 Would your views change if Jane’s brother called her regularly for advice about investments 
and personal money management? 
 Would your views change if Jane Smith provided some consulting work, but no auditing 
services to Able? 
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Assistant Technical Director  
 
February 7, 2000 
 
Dear ______: 
I am writing to ask you to contribute half an hour of your time to an important 
research effort. 
The Independence Standards Board (ISB) was established by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to provide and maintain independence standards for auditors 
of public companies.  As part of its mandate, the ISB has commissioned Earnscliffe 
Research and Communications to conduct a small number of interviews among the 
most senior executives in a variety of business fields.  Earnscliffe is a firm highly 
experienced at conducting this type of research. 
Attached please find a letter of request from Earnscliffe for an interview.  The 
subject of the interview will be your views on how well auditor independence is 
maintained today, and how best to ensure auditor independence in the future.  The 
views of those who agree to participate will be reported without attribution.  The 
findings will be used to help shape the agenda for the ISB in the years to come. 
These interviews are ideally conducted in person, however if an in person interview 
is impossible, a telephone interview can also be arranged.  Every effort will be made 
to do the interview at a time and in a location convenient for you. 
We very much appreciate the challenge of finding a half an hour to spare, and hope 
that you will give this request favorable consideration.  If you would like to know 
more about the research or have any other questions, please do not hesitate to 




William T. Allen 
Chairman 
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Earnscliffe Research and Communications has been retained by the Independence 
Standards Board (ISB) to conduct a number of research interviews with a sample of 
very senior people in various business fields. 
Further to the letter from the Chairman of the ISB, we are writing to ask if it would be 
possible to arrange an interview.  Roughly one half hour of your time would be 
required.  The subject would be your views on how well auditor independence is 
maintained today, and how best to ensure auditor independence in the future. 
As is customary with this type of research, the views of those who agree to participate 
will be reported without attribution.  The findings will be used to help shape the 
agenda for the ISB in the years to come. 
Elizabeth Nickolas of my office will be in touch to follow up on this letter in the next 
day or two.  We very much hope you will be able to find the time to share your views, 
and every effort will be made to conduct the interview at a time and a location 
convenient to you.  If you would like more information before considering this 
request, please do not hesitate to contact me at (613) 233-8080 or Art Siegel, 
Executive Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141. 
Sincerely,  
 
Bruce Anderson 
